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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Catheryn D. Fields appeals from her convictions 0n three counts ofbattery 0n a law

enforcement ofﬁcer.

Statement

Of The

Ofﬁcers

Bar and
p.

And Course Of The Proceedings

Bowman and Robideau responded t0 a call of a ﬁght in progress at the Hub

(TL, p. 178, L. 8

Grill.

—

295, L. 5

Facts

p.

— p.

180, L. 18; p. 226, L. 21

Once

299, L. 14.)

— p. 228,

L. 20;

there they found Fields being detained

ﬂ alﬁ

Tr.,

by other bar

patrons (including off—duty ofﬁcers) and placed Fields in handcuffs. (Tr., p. 180, L. 19

229, L. 2

p. 182, L. 10; p.

—

231, L. 4; p. 299, L. 15

p.

—

p.

301, L. 2.) Fields

and otherwise battered the ofﬁcers repeatedly as they attempted
as they attempted t0 control her at the scene,

183, L. 4; p. 184, L. 8

16; State’s Exhibits

—p. 192,

1, 2.)

and again

L. 2; p. 195, L. 8

Fields later battered an ofﬁcer

jailers t0 help control Fields.

(TL, p. 301, L. 17

—

p.

(T12, p. 182, L. 11

L. 11; p. 231, L. 5

who responded t0

308, L.

kicked

to place her in a police car,

at the jail.

—p. 197,

hit,

—

1; p.

— p.

—p. 248,

L.

a request from

326, L. 14

—

p.

333, L.

24.)

The

state

(R., pp. 52-53.)

charged Fields with three counts of battery on a law enforcement ofﬁcer.
Prior t0

trial,

Fields requested an instruction stating that a “peace ofﬁcer

may make an arrest” if there is “probable
is

cause,” and an ofﬁcer “making an unlawful arrest

not engaged in the performance of his 0r her duties.” (R., p. 96.) At the jury instruction

conference during the
290, L. 10

—

p.

trial,

292, L. 4.)

the district court declined the proposed instruction.

The jury convicted

Fields ﬁled a notice 0f appeal, timely

Fields

0n

all

three counts.

from entry 0f the judgment.

(Tr., p.

(R., p. 153.)

(R., pp. 166-70.)

ISSUE
Fields states the issue

Did

0n appeal

as:

the court err in refusing to give the defense requested instruction

When

a peace ofﬁcer

may

0n

arrest?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has

Fields failed t0

show

that declining her

the instruction misstated the law and

was

proposed instruction was error because

inconsistent With the facts?

ARGUMENT
Fields”

A.

Proposed Instruction Misstated The

Law And Was

Inconsistent

With The Facts

Introduction

The

district

court

concluded that Fields’ proposed instruction was neither

“required” nor “appropriate.” (T12, p. 290, Ls. 10-1

1.)

First, the district

court did not see

the instruction as consistent With applicable law, especially State V. Kelly, 158 Idaho 862,

353 P.3d 1096
at this

upon

(Ct.

App. 2015). (TL,

p.

290, L. 12

— p. 291,

point in time doesn’t give rise t0 any ﬁnding” and

it

L. 10.) Second, “the evidence

would be an “improper comment

the evidence” for the court t0 “focus in solely 0n” the issue 0f the arrest

Where the

ofﬁcers testiﬁed that “they arrested for battery upon a law enforcement ofﬁcer while there

was a detention before

that situation.” (Tr., p. 291, Ls. 11-21.1) Finally, the district court

reasoned that the “Idaho Standard Criminal Jury Instructions do not contemplate taking
this

approach” in deﬁning the ofﬁcer’s duties, which can be “wide-ranging.” (TL,

p.

291,

Ls. 21-24.)

Fields argues that the district court erred, contending the proposed instruction

correctly states the law, that the evidence supports the giving of the instruction, and the

instruction does not

incorrect.

LC.

First,

comment 0n

the evidence.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-15.)

Whether the ofﬁcers were “engaged in the performance of

§ 18-915(3)(b),

Fields

is

[their] duties,”

did not depend 0n the existence of probable cause t0 arrest Fields.

Rather, the ofﬁcers were engaged in the performance 0f their duties t0 investigate a

reported bar ﬁght regardless 0f Whether there was, or

1

The

district court left

was

open the option of renewing a request

the evidence later presented (TL, p. 291, L. 25

request (Tr., p. 358, L. 19

— p.

359, L. 10).

— p. 292,

not, a

Fourth

Amendment

on
renew her

for the instruction based

L. 3), but Fields did not

Violation.

batteries

Second, the evidence did not support the instruction, because none 0f the three

happened

at a

time there was even arguably a lack 0f probable cause.

evidence showed that the ﬁrst battery preceded the

were committed

arrest,

after Fields’ arrest for the ﬁrst battery,

supported by probable cause. Finally, the

and the second and third battery

which was

district court

The

clearly (and admittedly)

properly concluded that the scope

of the ofﬁcer’s duties was a matter for evidence and factual determination, not instructions
trying t0 establish

Standard

B.

what

is

and

is

not within the scope of an ofﬁcer’s duties.

Of Review

Whether a jury was properly instructed
exercises free review.

“An

is

a question 0f law over which this Court

State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710,

error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error

215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009).

when the

instruction misled

the jury 0r prejudiced the party challenging the instruction.” Li. (citation omitted). “If the

instructions, considered as a Whole, fairly

and adequately present the issues and

state the

applicable law, then n0 error has been committed.” Li. (quotations, citation and brackets

omitted).

“We

exercise free review over statutory interpretation because

law.” State V. Owens, 158 Idaho

C.

The

Instruction

“A trial

1, 3,

a question 0f

343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015).

Was Neither Legally Nor Factuallv Appropriate

court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury

law necessary for the jury’s information.” State
414, 430 (2009) (citing LC. § 19-2132).
‘nature

it is

V.

0n

all

matters 0f

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d

“This necessarily includes instructions 0n the

and elements 0f the crime charged and the essential legal principles applicable

t0

the evidence that has been admitted.”’

P.3d 920, 922

(Ct.

App. 2004)).

It

Li. (citing State V. Gain,

also includes,

when

140 Idaho 170, 172, 90

requested, instructions 0n “every

defense 0r theory 0f the defense having any support in the evidence.” State

Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State

V.

323, 328, 986 P.2d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 1999)). Although “[e]ach party
the delivery 0f speciﬁc instructions,

’7

‘6

and pertinent.’” Severson, 147 Idaho

2132).

“A proposed

is

at

Hansen, 133 Idaho
is

entitled t0 request

if

by other

the facts of the case.”’ Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-1

it is:

(1)

an erroneous

m

instructions; or (3) ‘not supported

1,

215 P.3d

at

430-31 (citing

by

103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982)). “[T]he court should not use an

instruction that misleads the jury or misstates the law.”

properly concluded that Fields’ proposed instruction was neither “required”

district court

nor “appropriate.” (TL,

The

State V. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888,

Application of these standards shows that the

890, 55 P.3d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 2002).

state

p.

290, Ls. 10-1

1.)

charged Fields under

I.C.

§

(R., pp.

18-915(3)(b).

52-53.)

subsection criminalizes a battery (except unlawﬁll touching) “[W]hile the Victim
in the

they are

710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. § 19-

not ‘correct and pertinent’ if

statement 0f the law; (2) adequately covered

M,

Turner, 136

such instructions will only be given

‘correct

instruction

V.

is

That

engaged

performance ofhis duties and the person committing the offense knows 0r reasonably

should

know

that such Victim is a

peace officer.”

I.C.

§

18-915(3)(b).

Under

this

subsection, the state did not need t0 prove that Fields battered the ofﬁcers “because 0fthe

performance of his or her ofﬁcial duty” 0r “ofﬁcial

status.” State V. Kelly,

865, 353 P.3d 1096, 1099 (Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis original).

show

that the ofﬁcer

was performing

his or her duty”

158 Idaho 862,

Rather, the state “must

and need not show

that the ofﬁcer

was “engaged

in

any speciﬁc duty.” Li (emphasis added). “Without question, an ofﬁcer’s

duties include responding t0 calls for assistance

and helping

citizens.” Li. at 866,

353 P.3d

at 1100.

proposed instruction was contrary to the plain language 0f the

Fields’

statute

and

the analysis in Killy. That proposed instruction, after quoting the statutory probable cause

standard for arrest, provided that “[a] peace ofﬁcer making an unlawful arrest

engaged

in the

performance of his 0r her duties.”

is

not

However, “[W]ithout

(R., p. 96.)

question, an ofﬁcer’s duties include responding t0 calls” regarding bar ﬁghts. Killy, 158

Idaho

at 866,

353 P.3d

analysis of that statute in

m

response means the ofﬁcer
instruction

is

in the

in the plain language

suggests that

some

n0 longer engaged

would have improperly limited

were “engaged
arrest

Nothing

1100.

at

performance of

illegality

in the

of the

statute or in the

during the course of that

performance 0f his

duties.

This

the jury’s consideration 0f Whether the ofﬁcers

[their] duties” t0 the sole

question 0f whether their

of Fields was supported by probable cause. The proposed instruction

is

incompatible

with the plain language of the statute and the analysis in Killy—that the “statute does not
require that the ofﬁcer be engaged in any speciﬁc duty.”

158 Idaho

at

865, 353 P.3d at

1099.

The

district court correctly

recognized that reducing the element 0f “engaged in the

performance of his duties” t0 whether Field’s arrest was supported by probable cause was
inconsistent With the applicable law and facts.

call

about a bar ﬁght and

180, L. 18; p. 226, L. 21

L. 19

—p. 182,

The

ﬁrst

two Victims were responding

initially investigating that potential crime.

— p. 228,

L. 10; p. 229, L. 2

L. 20;

ﬂ alﬂ

—p. 231,

Tr., p.

295, L. 5

L. 4; p. 299, L. 15

— p.

(Tr., p. 178, L. 8

— p.

t0 a

—

p.

299, L. 14; p. 180,

301, L. 2.) Their duties

encompassed

far

more than

their arrest

of Fields, and her batteries

at the

scene occurred

While the ofﬁcers were engaged in those other duties as well. The third battery happened

an ofﬁcer completely uninvolved in the arrest

at the jail substantially after the arrest, t0

(TL, P. 301, L. 17

itself.

— p.

308, L.

none ofbatteries (especially the

1; p.

326, L. 14

— p.

333, L. 24.)

last ofﬁcer, battered at the jail

The argument

and uninvolved in the

that

arrest)

occurred While the ofﬁcers were “engaged in the performance 0f his duties” because 0f a
misstep

when

ﬁrst encountering Fields

statement of the law,

was

is

senseless.

The

instruction

inapplicable under the facts, and

was not an accurate

would have been

at best

misleading and confusing.
Fields contends that the district court erred in relying

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)

not applicable.

However,

in

0n Killy, which she claims

making

this

argument Fields

discusses a completely different portion 0f the Killy opinion than the portion cited

relied

on by the

relied

0n the portion of the Killy opinion related

290, L. 23

— p.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.)

district court.

t0

ﬂ

district court

A and B

by and

speciﬁcally

an ofﬁcer’s duties. (Compare

291, L. 10 (statutory discussion of parts

removing persons from a bar)

The

is

T11, p.

and community safety or

Killy, 158 Idaho at 865-66, 353 P.3d at 1099-1100

(discussing subsections (a) and (b) “responding to calls for assistance” in removing a

person from a bar).) Fields, however, addresses only a different part ofthe
relating t0

whether Kelly was entitled to a self—defense

9-10 (citing Killy, 158 Idaho
court’s reasoning

at 867,

353 P.3d

and the relevant analysis

man. Having ignored the

instruction.

at 1101).)

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

Rather than address the

in Killy, Fields has

district court’s analysis

Kiwi decision,

district

chosen t0 address a straw

and discussed an irrelevant part 0f the

authority the district court relied on, Fields has failed t0

show

error.

After ignoring the relevant part of Kelly, Fields next relies on State

114 Idaho 174, 178, 755 P.2d 471, 475

Keeping with a

was charged with

comply With an ofﬁcer’s command

truck the ofﬁcer had requested to

at

App. 1988). (Appellant’s

pattern, Fields also ignores the relevant parts

In Wilkerson the defendant

t0

(Ct.

tow the

car.

brief, pp. 10-11.)

of Wilkerson.

resisting

that she not stand

Wilkerson,

V.

and obstructing by refusing

between her son’s car and a tow

Wilkerson, 114 Idaho

at

174-77, 755 P.2d

471-74. The court was careful t0 point out that Wilkerson’s resistance t0 her arrest was

not part of the charge: “Wilkerson was arrested and apparently charged and prosecuted for

her conduct before the arrest,” conduct that “consisted 0f obstructing the tow truck operator

and refusing

to

474 (emphasis

obey the deputy’s order
original).

The court then

carefully distinguished the

from the “recourse

resistance” present in that case

V.

to cease that obstruction.” Li. at 177,

at

at

m

178-79, 755

475-76. The court then held that “Where an individual refuses t0 obey an order or

obstructs an act 0f a public ofﬁcer

that individual does not Violate

‘duty’ as

officer.”

used in that

statute t0

Which

LC.

is

contrary t0 the law, be

§ 18-705.” Li. at 180,

755 P.3d

statute or constitution,

at

477.

“We
acts

interpret

of a public

I_d.

Although

analysis.

it

encompass only those lawful and authorized

Fields contends that last sentence about “duty”

p. 11.)

at

“mere passive

t0 force or Violence” addressed in

Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 511 P.2d 263 (1973). Wilkerson, 114 Idaho

P.2d

755 P.2d

this

argument

may

Such closer analysis shows

of Wilkerson.

is

controlling.

hold some superﬁcial appeal,
Fields’

argument

is

it

(Appellant’s brief,

does not withstand

instead contrary to the reasoning

First, the

Court in Wilkerson stated that “[i]n the arrest-resistance context courts

have deﬁned ofﬁcial duties broadly” and cited the applicable

“‘Engaged

performance 0f ofﬁcial duties’

in

scope 0f What the agent

The

is

test in that

context as:

simply acting Within the
Whether the agent is

employed
compass 0r is engaging in a personal frolic of his own. It
cannot be said that an agent who has made an arrest loses his ojﬁcial
capacity z'fthe arrest is subsequently adjudged t0 be unlawful.”
t0 do.

is

test is

acting within that

Wilkerson, 114 Idaho

at 179,

755 P.2d

at

476 (emphasis added) (quoting United

Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir. 1967).

States V.

Thus, the general rule, that some attendant

unlawfulness does not demonstrate the ofﬁcer was not performing ofﬁcial duties, was

recognized in Wilkerson. That rule, directly opposed to the proposed instruction, was the

law applicable here.

More

importantly, the Wilkerson court

was “not prepared to accept the proposition

that our legislature intended t0 criminalize passive disobedience t0

any

act

of a police

9”
ofﬁcer,” and thus concluded “the legislature intended that the term ‘duty in the resist and

obstruct

misdemeanor

statute

term” in the felony battery

755 P.2d

at

statute,

his duty, is punishable ....”

1,

LC.

477 (emphasis added). The

Who knowingly resists by the

3 19, §

“should be interpreted more narrowly than the comparable

p. 666).

§ 18-2703,

statute in

addressed in Richardson. Li.

at 180,

Richardson provided: “Every person

use of force 0r Violence, such ofﬁcer, in the performance 0f

LC.

§

18-2703 (1972) (repealed Idaho Session Laws 1981, Ch.

As Wilkerson

recognized, the Idaho Supreme Court had already

concluded that a defendant was not entitled t0 an instruction that a defendant had a right t0
Violently resist even an unlawful arrest. Richardson, 95 Idaho at 449-45 1 511 P.2d at 266,

269.

The Wilkerson court

distinguished, but did not (and could not) overrule Richardson’s

holding, and

was

it is

Richardson’s holding that applies in this case because Fields’ resistance

Violent.

In Richardson the Idaho

Supreme Court adopted “the rule

that a private citizen

may

not use force to resist a peaceful arrest by one he knows, or has good reason t0 believe,

an authorized peace ofﬁcer performing his duties, regardless ofwhether the arrest is

under the circumstances.” 95 Idaho

ofwhether the arrest

is

illegal

at

450, 511 P.2d

at

under the circumstances 0f the occasion,

knows

may

believe

an authorized peace ofﬁcer in the performance 0f his duties.”

not use force t0 resist an arrest by one he

268 (emphasis added). The court

P.2d

at

that

Wilkerson did not use

Wilkerson, 114 Idaho

in

we

or has

755 P.2d

at

hold that an

good reason
I_d.

at

t0

451, 511

Wilkerson distinguished Richardson by noting

force, but only passively resisted the ofﬁcer’s

at 180,

illegal

267 (emphasis added). “Regardless

individual

is

is

477.

commands.

Because Fields’ resistance was anything

but passive, she was not entitled to an instruction that the legality of her arrest was relevant,

much

less controlling.

Fields’

proposed instruction was not a correct statement of the law

relevant t0 her Violent, as opposed to passive, conduct.

Fields also contests the district court’s conclusion that the facts did not support

giving the instruction.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-14.)

The

district court

noted that the

ofﬁcers testiﬁed that they arrested Fields only after she committed the ﬁrst battery on an
ofﬁcer. (TL, p. 291, Ls. 14-20;

p.

ﬂ alﬂ

Tr., p. 190, Ls. 2-15; p.

237, Ls. 2-3.) Fields argues the district court

View 0f the evidence
“was not the

that the

least intrusive

method used by

was

10

incorrect because “there

the police”

method reasonably

230, L. 21

when

available to

— p.
is

233, L. 2;

a reasonable

investigating the bar ﬁght

them” and therefore they

“arrested [her] when they held her to the ground and handcuffed her.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 12-13.) There are several flaws with this argument.
First, Fields did not request an instruction on when an investigative detention was
exceeded and resulted in a de facto arrest. The only evidence the jury had before it was
that Fields was not arrested until after she battered one of the officers, and was arrested for
that offense. The jury would not have been in a position to evaluate the legality of the
investigative detention because Fields did not request any instruction on the legality of the
investigative detention, only regarding the arrest.
Second, there is no reasonable view of the evidence suggesting the arrest for
battery, as testified to by the officers, was not based on probable cause. Fields in fact
acknowledges that, accepting her theory of the case, “she would still be guilty of
misdemeanor battery.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) There is no reasonable view of the
evidence suggesting the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Fields after she first started
kicking them. Thus, there is no reasonable view of the evidence that officers were not
engaged in the performance of their duties after they formally arrested Fields.
Third, even if the jury could have concluded an arrest happened when the officers
first put Fields in handcuffs, the batteries did not occur then. They happened later. (In the
third count much later, at a different location, and to an officer that had no involvement in
the arrest.) In other words, even accepting Fields’ theories the officers were engaged in
duties other than conducting the alleged unlawful de facto arrest at the time of the batteries.
The evidence in this case does not support Fields’ argument that her batteries did
not occur “[w]hile the victim[s] [were] engaged in the performance of [their] duties.” I.C.
§ 18-915(3)(b). Even if Field’s legal premise (that an arrest unsupported by probable cause

11

is outside of official duties) is accepted, and her factual premise (that an unlawful arrest
happened when Fields was first handcuffed) is likewise accepted, there is no basis for
believing officers were not engaged in the performance of their duties at the time of the
batteries, which (accepting Fields’ theories) occurred significantly after the arrest. Indeed,
to accept Fields’ factual arguments requires the assumption that all actions by the officers
after the alleged de facto arrest were outside the scope of duty. The facts show that Fields
started battering the officers when they attempted to put her in a police car. Fields
continued to batter the officers when they formally arrested her and took control of her
after the initial battery. Fields then battered officers at the jail on two different occasions,
one resulting in a charge for battering an officer uninvolved in the initial fracas. Fields’
argument assumes that putting her in a police car, arresting and controlling her after she
battered an officer, and controlling her at the jail quite a bit later, were, in addition to the
alleged de facto arrest, outside the three officers’ duties. There is no legal basis for this
assumption. Because the batteries occurred after the allegedly unlawful de facto arrest,
while the officers were engaged in duties other than conducting the alleged initial arrest,
there is no basis for instructing that a lack of probable cause for the initial de facto arrest
was a defense under the facts of this case.
Fields next argues that the instruction was not an improper comment on the
evidence because it was not a statement on the “probative value of certain evidence.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) This argument miscomprehends the district court’s ruling and
fails to show error. As found by the district court, there are no ICJIs detailing what is and
is not within the scope of an officer’s duties, and to “focus in solely on the issue of the
purported and alleged arrest” would be “improper comment upon the evidence.” (Tr., p.
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291, Ls. 10-20.) The district court was correct: to instruct the jury that if the alleged de

facto arrest was unlawful such would be a defense would be t0

because

it

would focus the jury on one aspect of the evidence

comment 0n

at the

the evidence

expense 0f others. The

evidence in this case, as set forth in the factual statement above, was that Fields engaged
in a long course

0f Violent conduct against

were engaged

many

the jury

duties

in

duties, only

The ofﬁcers

one 0f Which was alleged t0 be unlawful. Instructing

0n which actions taken by the jury were within or without the scope of the ofﬁcer’s

amounts

The

to a

comment 0n the

instruction parsing

the jury as t0

its

error

the ofﬁcer

was “engaged

in the

ﬁnding

that the battery

performance of his duties”

(R., pp.

18-915(3)(b)) adequately instructed the jury 0n this element.

141-43; I.C. §

shown n0

evidence.

instructions giving the statutory language requiring a

was committed “while”

Which

acts

proper focus and amounted to a

by the

district court in rejecting

Although There

Any

may or may have been outside that duty would have misled

and ultimately misleading jury

D.

at least three different ofﬁcers.

comment on

the evidence.

Fields has

her legally erroneous, factually irrelevant,

instruction.

Was No

Error,

The Claimed Error

Is

Necessarily Harmless

Harmless error analysis applies unless “an improper jury instruction affected the
entire deliberative process.” State V.

An

Peg,

150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).

erroneous description 0f an element of the crime

deliberative process, and

is

is

not an error that affects the entire

therefore subject to harmless error analysis.

State V. Larson,

158 Idaho 130, 137, 344 P.3d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 2014). Instructional error
it is

clear

beyond a reasonable doubt

that a rational jury
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would have found

is

harmless

if

the defendant

guilty absent the error.”’ State V. Bahr, 163 Idaho 433, 436,

2018) (quoting Neder

As

V.

United States, 527 U.S.

1,

set forth above, Fields did not just hit

414 P.3d 707, 710

5

—p. 183,

—p. 248, L.

1, 2.)

L. 4; p. 184, L. 8

16; p. 301, L. 17

—p. 192,

— p. 308,

L.

1; p.

an ofﬁcer once, she engaged in a course

L. 2; p. 195, L. 8

after her arrest.

—p. 197,

(TL, p.

L. 11; p. 231, L.

326, L. 14 —p. 333, L. 24; State’s Exhibits

According to Fields, she was arrested when placed in handcuffs

0f the encounter. (Appellant’s

App.

3 (1999)).

of hitting, kicking and biting several ofﬁcers both before and well
182, L. 11

(Ct.

brief, pp. 12-13.)

Ironically, this

was

at the

very initiation

the only time Fields

was not battering ofﬁcers. Rather than show a battery “While” the ofﬁcers were conducting
an allegedly unlawful defacto

arrest, the

evidence shows that Fields battered the ofﬁcers

“while [they were] engaged in the performance of [their] duties” related to her formal arrest
for the ﬁrst battery

and maintaining order

Fields’ appellate theory

at the jail.

depends 0n the ofﬁcers exercising only one police

duty—

the duty t0 arrest—and unlawﬁllly exercising that duty at the very beginning 0f the

encounter.

However, there were a myriad of police duties accomplished

Violence, controlling her so she could be transported,

formally arresting her after the

initial

and controlling her

At a minimum, the

arrest her,

at the jail.

ﬁrst kick gave rise t0 grounds t0 legally

and the Violence she thereafter unleashed 0n the two ofﬁcers

the third ofﬁcer at the jail

here, including

were a proper and inevitable basis

for

ﬁnding

at the

scene and

that she battered

the ofﬁcers “[w]hile [they were] engaged in the performance of [their] duties.” I.C. § 18-

915(3)(b). Because the evidence establishes that Fields battered

all

three Victims after her

undeniably legal arrest for the ﬁrst kick, no reasonable jury could have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the batteries after the formal arrest were committed while the ofﬁcers
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were engaged
given.

in the

The claimed

performance of their
error

is

clearly,

duties,

even had the requested instruction been

beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

DATED this 9th day 0f October, 2019.
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Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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